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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3124 
 ___________ 
 
 REN QUAN ZHENG, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
     Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A079-301-998) 
 Immigration Judge:  Charles M. Honeyman 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 13, 2011 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed:  April 19, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Ren Quan Zheng petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will grant the petition for review and remand for further proceedings. 
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 Because the parties are familiar with the background, we will present it here only 
briefly.  Zheng is a native and citizen of China who illegally entered the United States in 
2000.  He conceded removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  His application was based on his 
claims of past persecution and fear of future persecution for having violated China’s 
coercive family planning laws.  In 2002, after a hearing at which Zheng testified in 
support of his claims, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) made an adverse credibility finding, 
denied all forms of requested relief, and ordered Zheng’s removal to China.  The BIA 
agreed with the IJ’s decision and dismissed Zheng’s appeal in 2003.  In May 2007, Zheng 
filed a motion to reopen concerning his family planning claim.  In August 2007, the BIA 
denied the motion as untimely, but it also indicated that the motion would not have been 
granted if it were considered on its merits. 
 In October 2009, Zheng filed his second motion to reopen.  This time, he asserted 
a fear of religious persecution as a practicing Christian and claimed that the authorities in 
China have intensified their persecution of Christians who attend churches not approved 
by the Chinese government.  He stated that he would not attend a government-approved 
church if he returned to China and would instead join an underground church, where 
Christians can freely exchange their ideas.  Zheng submitted documents in support of his 
motion.  On June 21, 2010, the BIA denied the motion to reopen, noting that the motion 
was both time-barred and number-barred under the regulations.  The BIA concluded that 
Zheng’s church attendance was a change in personal circumstances rather than a change 
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in circumstances or conditions arising in China that would exempt him from the time 
limitations for filing a motion to reopen.  Further, the BIA found that Zheng’s evidence 
did not support the assertion that country conditions had changed concerning the 
treatment of Christians in China.  The BIA also noted that Zheng did not submit any 
evidence that the Chinese government is aware of his religious activities in the United 
States.  This petition for review followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review the BIA’s denial of 
Zheng’s motion to reopen, and we apply the abuse of discretion standard to our review.  
See Sevoian v. Ashcroft,  290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  Thus, to succeed on his 
petition for review, Zheng must show that the BIA’s decision was somehow arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.  See id. 
 An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file it with the 
BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was 
rendered.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  The time and number requirements are waived for 
motions to reopen that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country 
of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have 
been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  
Zheng argues that he meets this exception as to the time and number restrictions.  
Although Zheng would have no claim for relief absent a change in his personal 
circumstances of having joined a church in the United States, we have recognized that an 
alien who has been ordered removed can file an untimely or successive asylum 
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application based on changed personal conditions if he can also show changed country 
conditions in his motion to reopen.  Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009).1 
 In support of his motion to reopen, Zheng submitted his personal affidavit and a 
letter from his church confirming his weekly regular attendance and participation.  Zheng 
also submitted evidence to show changed country conditions.  For example, Zheng 
submitted a letter dated April 8, 2009, from a cousin in China.  The letter states that the 
cousin has been attending church meetings for about five years, meeting at different 
locations with other members to avoid detection by the Chinese government.  The cousin 
wrote, “A lot of things happened to our church last year.  During December of last year, 
we were discovered by the local government.”  A.R. 21.  The cousin recounts that 
officials damaged some property at the home where a church meeting was being held, 
and the cousin, along with the homeowner and other church members, were taken to the 
police station, where the cousin was beaten.  The group was released five days later.  
Zheng also submitted a letter from a friend in China, who wrote about a separate incident 
in January 2009, when the police arrived at a church Bible discussion and prayer meeting 
being held at the friend’s house.  The friend stated that the police arrived at the meeting 
and informed the group that their meeting was illegal.  The friend and five other church 
members were taken to the police station and beaten.  After five days of detention, they 
                                                 
1
 The government acknowledges our decision in Liu and asserts that Zheng’s change in 
personal circumstances of joining a church is distinct from a change in country conditions 
required for reopening under section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  See Gov’t. Brief at 15 (citing Liu, 
555 F.3d at 150-51).  To the extent that the government argues that a change in personal 
circumstances can never be a basis of a motion to reopen for changed country conditions, 
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were released with a warning not to engage in similar gatherings.  Zheng also submitted 
articles dating from 2006 to 2009, relating to China’s crackdown on underground 
churches and reporting increased numbers of detentions and other harassment of 
Christian congregants during that time period. 
 Zheng argues that the BIA abused its discretion by basing its decision on a 
selective reading of the evidence and discussing only one of Zheng’s articles in its 
decision.  Indeed, with respect to its finding that Zheng’s argument of changed country 
conditions is not supported by the proffered evidence, the BIA stated only that “[t]he 
conditions discussed in the respondent’s articles illustrate continuing conditions in China, 
reflected by, inter alia, the 4 year span in reportage.  In fact, the November 30, 2006, 
New York Times article indicates that underground churches have experienced strife 
since the Falun Gong movement in the late 1990’s.”  A.R. 3 (citation omitted).  The BIA 
did not mention or explain why other articles describing “worsening” conditions and 
“new crackdowns” on Christians during the 2006-2009 period were insufficient to 
support Zheng’s position, even though Zheng discussed these articles in his brief to the 
BIA.
2
  We add the BIA mentioned the letters submitted as evidence, but it provided no 
explanation why they did not support Zheng’s application. 
                                                                                                                                                             
we reject the argument insofar as it is inconsistent with our decision in Liu. 
2
 Moreover, although the articles span a four-year period in dates, we note that those 
years post-date the BIA’s 2003 final order regarding Zheng’s original removal 
proceedings.  Without further explanation, that time span in reporting alone would not 
necessarily drive the conclusion that the evidence illustrates a “continuing” condition as 
opposed to a “changed” condition in China. 
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 Although the BIA need not “parse or refute on the record each individual . . . piece 
of evidence offered by the petitioner,” it “should provide us with more than cursory, 
summary or conclusory statements, so that we are able to discern its reasons for declining 
to afford relief to a petitioner.”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268  (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)).  In Zheng, we vacated the 
BIA’s denial of two motions to reopen based on changed country conditions in China 
because the BIA failed to discuss in an adequate fashion the petitioners’ evidence or 
explain why the evidence was not sufficient.  See Zheng, 549 F.3d at 268-69, 271.  We 
reach the same result here. 
 In its brief, the government discusses the evidence submitted by Zheng and argues 
why it believes that it does not demonstrate a change in country conditions.  None of this 
reasoning is present in the BIA’s decision.  We may only review the BIA’s decision 
based on the rationale that it provided.  See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 
(1947); Konan v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2005).  Because the BIA’s 
decision does not allow us to discern its reasons for denying the motion to reopen, we 
will grant the petition for review and remand for further proceedings.
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3
 We leave the question of whether Zheng has presented a prima facie case for relief to 
the BIA to determine, after it examines the threshold issue of whether Zheng has showed 
changed country conditions.  See Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 
2007).  
